The OSCE Minsk Group, established in 1992 to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the [former] Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict, failed to achieve its objectives for almost three decades, rendering it an ineffective and dysfunctional mechanism for conflict resolution in the South Caucasus. Co-chaired by Russia, the United States, and France, the Group’s mediation efforts have been undermined by conflicting interests among its co-chairs, geopolitical shifts, and a lack of authority. Key historical junctures, including the failures at the 1996 Lisbon Summit, the 2001 Key West talks, the 2016 Four-Day April War, and the 2020 Second Karabakh War, highlight the Group’s inability to move beyond symbolic gestures and enforce the UN Security Council resolutions demanding Armenia to withdraw its occupying forces from the territories of Azerbaijan. The 2020 Second Karabakh War, culminating in Azerbaijan’s military reclamation of its territories and the sidelining of the Minsk Group with Russia’s unilateral mediation, underscored its obsolescence. Azerbaijan and Türkiye have consistently criticized the Group’s perceived biases and inefficacy, advocating for its dissolution and the adoption of a regionally led peace process. Conversely, Armenia’s initial reliance on the Group to advance its territorial claims under the ‘self-determination’ agenda has given way to a pragmatic acknowledgement of its post-2020 irrelevance. This article critically examines the Minsk Group’s establishment, operational shortcomings, and the geopolitical dynamics that precipitated its failure, arguing that its dissolution is a necessary step toward a more inclusive and effective framework for sustainable peace and stability in the South Caucasus.